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1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that trade liberalization enhances economic e¢ ciency, accelerates
growth, and very likely boosts income. However, freer trade may also lead to a loss of
tax revenue as tari¤s and other trade taxes are cut and an evaluation of the revenue im-
plications of trade liberalization becomes important. For countries with signicant scal
imbalances, any loss of revenue would be an important consideration. It might endanger
the provision of public goods, increase the social burden of tari¤ cuts and as such erode
the willingness for future liberalization (Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2006). This applies to many
developing countries and emerging market economies alike. Despite signicant progress in
reducing trade barriers over the last decade, taxes on international trade still constitute a
major source of revenue for these economies. Ebrill et al. (1999), for example, show that
the share of trade taxes to GDP is inversely related to the level of development, with many
low-income countries from Africa accounting for 5.5% of trade taxes to GDP on average in
1995, only marginally down from 6.7% in 1975.
There exists an extensive literature discussing the welfare e¤ects of piecemeal tari¤ re-
forms precluding the revenue motive for deploying trade taxes, see, for example, Hatta (1977)
and, for a survey, Woodland (1982), and more recently Anderson and Neary (2005). Formal
treatments of the scal implications of trade liberalization when tari¤ revenue considerations
are important are developed, for example, by Michael et al. (1991), Tsuneki (1995), Keen
and Ligthart (2002), and Anderson and Neary (2006). Keen and Ligthart (2002), for exam-
ple, develop a practical strategy whereby tari¤ cuts are o¤set by increases in consumption
taxes to secure e¢ ciency gains from trade liberalization while preserving public revenue for
a small open economy. Since important information about the technology and preferences
required for the implementation of such rules are often missing, Anderson and Neary (2006)
propose su¢ cient conditions that guarantee welfare improving tari¤ reforms, making use of
moments of the distribution of a cross-section of tari¤s.1
What these contributions have in common is that they focus exclusively on e¢ ciency
e¤ects of tari¤ changes for small open economies while ignoring distributional issues. By
contrast, our paper analyzes various forms of trade liberalization under the assumption that
revenue losses have to be compensated either by reducing the provision of the public good
or by corresponding changes in income taxes in a framework that assigns a central role to
income di¤erences between and within countries.
Following Matsuyama (2000) and Stibora and de Vaal (2007) we use a Ricardian trade
1A related paper is Feehan (1988) who derives optimal tari¤ formulae to nance the provision of a public
good in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework.
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model with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze the consequences of trade liberalization
in a North-South set-up.2 They assume that tari¤ revenues are redistributed directly to
households, which is an innocuous assumption in models with homothetic preferences, but
not in models where the income elasticity deviates from one. Revenue from trade taxes are
moreover rarely rebated directly to households but constitute part of the overall government
budget. To capture this important aspect, we extend their framework by explicitly adding a
government sector that provides public goods for the benet of households. Public goods are
produced with labor and are nanced through revenues generated by income taxation and
import tari¤s. In addition to the public good, households consume a range of goods sup-
plied by perfectly competitive markets. We assume that these goods are indivisible and that
consumption for each good is satiated after one unit. We order goods according to priority
in consumption, the lowest-indexed goods have the highest priority in consumption and the
highest-indexed goods the lowest priority in consumption. This paves the way for nonho-
mothetic preferences since poor households are not able to consume the same consumption
basket as rich households. All households purchase the lower-indexed, high-priority, goods,
and when real income increases add higher-indexed, low-priority, goods to their consumption
baskets, instead of buying more of the goods they already consume. The higher-indexed,
low-priority, goods are therefore only a¤ordable by households with su¢ ciently high income
levels.3 Of the two countries we consider, South has a comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of lower-ranked, high priority, goods which all households consume, while the North
has a comparative advantage in the production in higher-ranked, low-priority, goods, which
household with higher income consume. This implies that the poor (rich) country produces
goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand. This makes our framework appropriate
for investigating North-South issues.
The assumption that the provision of public goods is nanced by tari¤ revenue combined
with nonhomothetic preferences generates new insights. Among other things, while North
cannot lose from unilateral tari¤reductions, South may lose from unilateral and may not gain
from multilateral trade liberalization. This is the result of asymmetric demand responses.
The fall in the price of lower-ranked goods increases real income and induces households to
shift expenditures away from lower-ranked goods toward higher-ranked goods. The income
e¤ect makes higher-ranked goods complements to lower-ranked goods in demand. This
2According to Deaton and Muellbauer (1983) most household budget studies support the assumption of
nonhomotheticity. Hunter and Markusen (1988) and Hunter (1991) report that as much as 29 percent of
world trade may be caused by nonhomogeneous preferences.
3Assuming that goods are indivisible in consumption is a simple and tractable way to include nonhomo-
thetic preferences in general equilibrium analyses, see e.g. Murphy et al. (1989), Krishna and Yavas (2005),
and Bertola et al. (2006).
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demand complementarity, however, is asymmetric in the sense, that when the price of higher-
ranked goods falls, households do not increase their purchases of lower-ranked goods.
Nonhomotheticity of preferences also implies that tari¤ reductions by the rich, northern
region have less adverse e¤ect on northern public good provision than a similar tari¤ cut
by the poor, southern region would have on southern public good provision. The reason is
that the real income gains that follow for South when North cuts tari¤s are spent on higher-
index goods produced in North, increasing trade volumes and northern tari¤ revenues. By
contrast, when South cuts its tari¤s, such benecial e¤ect does not occur for South. The
real income gains that arise in North are spent exclusively on northern goods and therefore
do not yield a boost to Souths import volume.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 details the model. Section 3 considers
a situation where countries di¤er in their income level and conducts comparative static
analysis to elaborate on the e¤ects of demand complementarities. We divide this section
into two subsections. The rst subsection focuses on the impact on public good provision,
keeping local income taxes constant. The second subsection keeps the level of the public
good provision constant, examining the required change in taxation for countries undergoing
trade liberalization. This section also provides a useful benchmark for the sections to follow.
Section 4 extends the analysis by assuming heterogeneous income groups of households in
each country. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider two countries, South and North, each having xed labor supplies. Both countries
produce a public good and a range of tradable competitive goods. The public good, being
characterized by jointness in consumption and non-excludability, is nanced in each region by
levying tari¤s on imported goods and by raising income taxes. The accruing tax revenues,
which are collected exclusively by the countrys government, are used to employ labor to
provide the public good.
The competitive goods sector consists of a continuum of competitive industries, indexed
by z 2 [0;1), each producing a homogeneous good also indexed by z. For good z, let a(z)
be the unit labor requirement in South and a(z) the unit labor requirement in North. Here
and in the sequel an asterisk denotes North. We dene a(z)=a(z) as the ratio of northern
to southern labor productivity and follow standard practice ranking commodities in order of
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diminishing southern comparative advantage:4
A(z)  a
(z)
a(z)
A0(z) < 0: (1)
The function A(z) is assumed to be continuous and strictly decreasing in z. Denoting
percentage changes da()=a() = ba(); and likewise for all other variables, the elasticity of
A(z) at z is dened as (z)  [ba(z)=bz   ba(z)=bz] =  A^(z)=bz. (z) which is positive and can
be arbitrarily large.
Trade ows are distorted by tari¤s. Let  ( ) be one plus the ad valorem tari¤ imposed
by South (North) when importing goods from North (South). All imported goods face the
same tari¤ rate. Good z will be produced in South when the northern unit labor cost
adjusted for the tari¤ exceeds the southern unit labor cost. We choose northern wages as
numéraire (w = 1). The wage rate in South is w, which also constitutes Souths factor
terms of trade. It then follows that good z will be produced in South if
wa(z)  a(z) or w  A(z): (2)
Similarly, any commodity z will be produced in North if
 wa(z)  a(z) or A(z)   w: (3)
The existence of import barriers imply that there are ranges of commodities that are not
traded. Let ez denote the borderline commodity between Souths non-traded commodities
and Norths exports and let ez be the borderline commodity between Souths exports and
Norths non-traded commodities. By imposing equalities in (2) and (3), these commodities
are seen to be ez = A 1(w=)ez = A 1( w);
where ez < ez (the latter follows as A 1; the inverse of A(z), is monotonically decreasing,
and w= <  w). Equations (2) and (3) imply that South produces all z 2 [0; ez] and North
all z 2 [ez;1): Commodities z 2 [0; ez] are exclusively produced in South and exported.
Souths inherent cost advantage in these goods is high enough to outweigh the trade taxes.
Similarly, Norths cost advantage in z 2 [ez;1) is so high that those higher-indexed goods are
exclusively produced there and exported. Goods z 2 (ez; ez) dene an intermediate range of
goods that both countries produce but do not trade. For these goods productivity di¤erences
are not high enough to outweigh the trade taxes for them to be traded. Even if traded, the
local price of good z does not need to be identical across countries:
p(z) = minfwa(z); a(z)g and p(z) = minfa(z);  wa(z)g:
4The continuum assumption is orginially due to Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977).
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Turning to the demand side, we suppose there are N households in South and N in
North. We follow Matsuyama (2000) and assume that the income distribution is nonde-
generate and brought about by di¤erences in skills reected in di¤erences in e¤ective labor
supply. We let F (h) and F (h) denote the distribution of e¤ective (skill based) labor sup-
ply across households in South and North, respectively. The total labor supply thus equals
L = N
R1
0
hdF (h) in South and L = N
R1
0
hdF (h) in North.
All households have identical preferences. The consumption set of a household includes
the consumption of a public good G and a continuum of z 2 [0;1). Specically, preferences
for an individual southern household are
Vj = lnG+
Z 1
0
b(z)x(z)dz: (4)
An isomorphic utility function applies to northern households. The rst expression on the
right hand sight of (4) reects the consumption of the public good, G. The specication
implies that the marginal utility of the public good is positive but decreasing. The second
part of (4) denotes the number of goods a households consumes of the competitive good z;
where b(z) > 0 is the utility of consuming good z and x(z) = f0; 1g denotes the consumption
indicator. The household budget constraint is given by
R1
0
p(z)x(z)dz  I; where x(z) =
f0; 1g and where I  (1   t)wh denotes post-tax household income.5 A household buys
good z; x(z) = 1; if the utility from the last unit of income spent   b(z)=p(z): The
order in which each household purchases goods is assumed to be the same as the order of
goods due to comparative advantage. Hence, we assume that households purchase lower-
indexed, high-priority, goods rst and with increasing income extend their consumption to
higher-indexed, lower-priority, goods.6 This requires that the order of utility per unit price
is strictly decreasing in z, that is, we assume that
b(z)
p(z)
=
b(z)
minfwa(z); a(z)g and
b(z)
p(z)
=
b(z)
minfa(z);  wa(z)g
are strictly decreasing in z for given w,  ; and  . This has the strong implication that,
in contrast to standard analysis, an increase in real income is reected in the consumption
5Alternatively, one could assume that the loss of tari¤ revenue is compensated by the strengthening of
domestic consumption taxation, for example, in form of value-added tax.
6Even though one could label lower-indexed goods as necessities and higher-ranked goods luxuries,
in our model this classication is not appropriate. None of the goods satises the denition of necessary
(luxury) goods usually found in textbooks. The reason is that the denition requires divisibility of goods
and looks at ininitesimal income changes while in our model goods come in discrete units. Income has to go
up su¢ cientlyfor a household to add a higher-indexed good to its consumption basket. Moreover, making
a division between necessities and luxuries is articial in our model, since our satiation assumption implies
that each good becomes a necessity once it is consumed.
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of an increased number of goods rather than in the consumption of higher quantities of a
xed number of goods. Combined with the ranking of factor intensity it follows that South
has a comparative advantage in the production of lower-ranked goods which are consumed
by poorer households, whereas North has a comparative advantage in the production of
higher-ranked goods that are purchased by richer households.
Dene
E(z) 
Z z
0
p(s)ds =
Z z
0
minfwa(s); a(s)gds (5)
as the minimum level of income required to allow a southern household to consume good z.
The highest-indexed commodity, n(h), a southern household with net income (1   t)wh is
able to consume is determined by the requirement that
E[n(h)] = (1  t)wh; (6)
where we assume that households take the import tari¤ and the income tax rate as given.7
Similarly, North produces higher-ranked commodities and imports the lower-indexed goods
from South paying a tari¤ inclusive price for every good z imported. The highest ranked
good, n(h), a northern household with net income (1   t)h is able to purchase is given
by
E[n(h)] = (1  t)h: (7)
Southern households purchase the competitive good z only if their income is not lower than
E(z); or equivalently if their skill is such that (1   t)wh exceeds E(z): Likewise, northern
households purchase good z if their skill is such that (1   t)h > E(z): The fraction of
southern households with income (skill) in excess of E(z) is given by 1   F [(E(z)=(1  
t)w]: Similarly, the fraction of northern households able to purchase good z is given by
1 F [E(z)=(1  t)]: Aggregate demand for good z consists of all those households in both
countries whose income is greater or equal than E(z). Consequently, demand from each
country is given by
Q(z) = N [1  FfE(z)=(1  t)wg]
Q(z) = N[1  F fE(z)=(1  t)g]:
(8)
A further equilibrium condition reects the clearing of factor markets. In South the public
good sector demands agG units of labor and since South produces goods in [0; ez] and exports
goods in [0; ez], southern labor market equilibrium requires:8
L = N
R1
0
hdF (h) = agG+
R ez
0
a(z)Q(z)dz +
R ez
0
a(z)Q(z)dz: (9)
7We abstract from optimal tari¤-tax rate competition between countries.
8We assume that public good provision does not entail scale economies so that the unit labor requirement
of public good provision is constant: ag in South and ag in North.
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The left hand side of (9) represents Souths e¤ective labor supply and the right hand side is
the derived demand for its labor, consisting of the demand for public goods and competitive
goods. Combining (9) and (8), and using (5), labor market equilibrium in South can be
expressed as (see Stibora and de Vaal 2007)
wL = wagG+N
R1
0
min f(1  t)wh;E(ez)g dF (h)
+
N
 
R1
0
min f(1  t)h; E(ez)g dF (h); (10)
where
E(ez) = Z ez
0
p(s)ds =
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds (11)
E(ez) = Z ez
0
p(s)ds =  
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds:
Equation (10) shows that a southern household spends minf(1   t)wh;E(~z)g on southern
goods while a northern household spends (1= )minf(1  t)h; E(~z)g on southern goods.
Similarly, agG
 units of northern labor are used to produce the public good. Additionally,
North produces goods in [ez;1) of which [ez;1) are possibly exported. Market clearing
implies
L = agG
 +
R1ez a(z)Q(z)dz + R1ez a(z)Q(z)dz; (12)
L = agG
 +
N

R1
0
max f(1  t)wh  E(ez); 0g dF (h)
+N
R1
0
max f(1  t)h   E(ez); 0g dF (h): (13)
A southern household spends (1=)max f(1  t)wh  E(ez); 0g on northern products, while
a northern household spends max f(1  t)h   E(ez); 0g on northern goods.
Since both economies are linked by trade, Walraslaw implies that equations (10) and (13)
can be replaced by the equivalent statement that the world goods market is in equilibrium
if the value of Souths exports equals its value of imports. This yields
N
 
R1
0
min

(1  t)h
w
;  
R ez
0
a(s)ds

dF (h) =
N

R1
0
max
n
(1  t)h  R ez
0
a(s)ds; 0
o
dF (h);
(14)
where we have used (11) to substitute for E(ez) and E(ez). In the sequel, we will refer to
(14) as the trade balance condition and note that it is a representation of the demand side
only.
Finally, we have to specify government balance. The public good G is nanced with an
income tax of size t and by tari¤ revenues TR. Both the income tax and the tari¤ rate
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are set by the government, which also collects the taxes and hires labor to produce public
goods. We assume that the collection of taxes is costly and introduce e¢ ciency parameters
to account for that. More specically, we assume that of all income taxes (import tari¤s)
collected, a share  t ( TR) can be used to provide public goods. Higher values for  t and
 TR imply more e¢ ciency in generating government revenue. Both parameters are strictly
between zero and one, implying that there is always some room for public goods provision,
but also that collecting taxes always incur e¢ ciency costs. Naturally,  t and  TR need not
be the same.
Assuming that governments budgets are always balanced requires for South that
wagG =  tLtw +  TRTR; (15)
and for North that
agG
 =  tL
t +  TRTR
; (16)
where 0 <  t ; 

TR < 1 are the e¢ ciency parameters for the northern government. Parame-
trizing the e¢ ciency of alternative sources of government income also captures the notion
that developing countries typically lack e¢ cient alternative mechanisms to raise income than
import taxation. Ebrill et al. (1999), for example, report that the share of trade taxes to
total revenue is inversely related to the level of development, with many low-income countries
earning half or more of their revenue from trade taxes.
Making use of (8), we express southern tari¤ revenue as
TR = (   1)
Z 1
ez a
(z)Q(z)dz
=
(   1)

N
Z 1
0
maxf(1  t)wh  E(ez); 0gdF (h):
Similarly, the expression for the northern tari¤ revenue is
TR =
(    1)
 
N
Z 1
0
minf(1  t)h; E(ez)gdF (h):
Regarding southern tari¤ revenue, TR, we note that it is only positive if there are southern
households who import, that is if the income of (some of the) southern households exceeds
E(ez). Otherwise TR = 0: By contrast, tari¤ revenue for the northern government, TR, are
always positive, since northern households always import (some of) the lower-indexed goods
produced by South.
Equations (2), (3), (6), (7), (14), (15) and (16) dene a system of equations jointly
determining the equilibrium values of ez, ez, w; n; n; G, and G.
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3 Trade liberalization and its scal implications: ho-
mogeneous populations
Since we are primarily interested in studying the e¤ects of trade liberalization and its scal
implication between countries with signicant income di¤erences we assume throughout the
paper that South has an absolute disadvantage in all industries, that is, a(z) < a(z) for all
z. This ensures that in equilibrium w < 1 and that northern households receive a higher
relative wage rate than southern households with the same skill level. In this section we
concentrate on the implications of income di¤erences between countries and assume that the
population in each country is homogeneous. That is, we momentarily ignore the potential
impact income di¤erences within countries might have. This will provide a useful benchmark
for the analysis to follow. For this purpose let each household be endowed with one unit of
e¤ective labor, i.e., h = h = 1: We note that these assumptions also imply that households
in both countries spend their last unit of income on the higher-indexed goods produced in
North.
Under these circumstances the balanced trade condition (14) becomes
N
Z ez
0
a(s)ds =
N

[(1  t) 
Z ez
0
a(s)ds] (17)
provided that
w < w 

1 +
N
N

(1  t)
 

(1  t) 
Z ez
ez a(s)ds
 1
: (18)
Equation (17) characterizes the trade balance condition if w is su¢ ciently small in equilib-
rium, that is: w < w.9 The trade balance condition therefore is independent of w and the
factor terms of trade only exerts an indirect impact through its e¤ect on ez and ez since all
households are rich enough to a¤ord the higher-ranked northern goods. A lower relative
wage in South would decrease the purchasing power of southern households, but the lower
spending this generates only a¤ects northern production. Similarly, the purchasing power
of northern households increases, which enhances spending on northern goods. As there
is balanced trade, these e¤ects on northern production and labor cancel out and no wage
adjustment is required to restore balanced trade.
Equation (17) indicates also that the trade balance condition depends on  and t, but
not on   and t. Let us consider the asymmetric reliance on the tari¤ rate as a similar
9For w > w, the trade balance condition becomes positively sloped in (w; z) space as it depends on w:
This is the case when only southern households are rich enough to buy northern goods, which we will however
not consider here.
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argument applies to the tax rate. When all households are rich enough to spend their last
unit of income on northern goods, a southern tari¤ reduction implies that prices of northern
goods fall for southern consumers. The concomitant real income gains are spent on northern
goods, increasing imports and the demand for northern labor. To preserve trade balance
South has to increase its range of production. On the other hand, when northern tari¤s
fall the real income gains accrue to northern households who also expand their consumption
basket toward the higher-ranked goods produced in North. There are no trade balance
implications, explaining the absence of   in the trade balance condition. As we will see, this
asymmetry in how the tari¤ rates have an e¤ect on the trade balance will help to explain
the asymmetric outcomes of trade liberalization.10
For the sake of graphical presentation, we note that for given taxes and relative wage
rate, (2) and (3) provide a relationship between ez and ez that must be satised. Since A(z)
is strictly decreasing in z, we can express ez as a function of ez; specically,
ez = A 1 [A(ez) ] :
Inserting this in (17) the balanced trade condition becomes a function of ez only:11
N
Z A 1[A(ez)]
0
a(s)ds =
N

[(1  t) 
Z ez
0
a(s)ds]; (19)
which is the relation that is plotted in (w; z) space in the upper panels of Figure 1a and 1b
together with the conditions of e¢ cient production (2) and (3). The government balanced
budget conditions replace (15) and (16) by
agG =  tNt+  TR
(   1)

N

(1  t) 
Z ez
0
a(s)ds

(20)
for South and
agG
 =  tN
t +  TR(
   1)N
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds; (21)
for North. Souths budget constraint does not directly depend on w, simply because both
the cost and revenue side are linearly related to wages. Of course, w has an indirect impact
through its e¤ect on ez, ez and n. We can depict both conditions in (G; z) space. In the
lower panel of Figure 1a, (20) is plotted as the downward sloping line GG: the larger is the
range of goods South produces, the smaller the imports and the concomitant tari¤ revenue,
10As shown in Stibora and de Vaal (2007), the asymmetry in the tari¤ rate does not appear when tari¤
revenues are redistributed back to households.
11Likewise, we could have expressed equation (19) as a function of ezonly, with obviously no consequences
for the analysis whatsoever. For a similar analysis see Obstfeld & Rogo¤ (1999).
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reducing the provision of public good in South. In the lower panel of Figure 1b, (21) is shown
as the positively sloped line GG for given w. The larger is the range of northern imports
the higher the tari¤ revenues the government is able to collect and hence the provision of
publicly provided good in the North.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the determination of ez, ez, w, G and G for the initial tari¤
distorted equilibrium. In the upper panel of both gures, the intersection of the TB and
A(z) schedules determines ~z and w, while the A(z)=  schedule is used to read o¤ the
equilibrium ez. The lower panel uses (20) to read o¤ the corresponding equilibrium value
for G (Figure 1a) and similarly the equilibrium value for G from (21) (Figure 1b).
[please insert Figure 1a and b about here]
In the initial tari¤ ridden equilibrium, the highest-indexed good consumed by a household
in South and North (n and n) is obtained from (6) and (7):Z ez
0
wa(s)ds+ 
Z n
ez a
(s)ds = (1  t)w (22)
 
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds+
Z n
ez a
(s)ds = (1  t): (23)
If we allow tax rates to be di¤erent, the fact that w < 1 ensures that (22) and (23) satisfyez < ez < n < n, unless the northern tax rate is considerably above Souths. In this case the
higher real wage rate for northern consumers is more than compensated by higher taxation,
leaving northern consumers with a lower net real income. For the remainder of the analysis
we exclude this possibility, making northern households richer than southern households in
equilibrium. Thus southern households consume all the goods produced in South plus some
northern goods (ez < n), while northern households consume all the goods southern house-
holds consume plus some (n < n). From the combination of the assumption on technology
(A(z) is strictly decreasing in z), the well-dened ordering of goods (b(z)=p(z); b(z)=p(z) are
strictly decreasing in z) and a(z) < a(z) it follows that South specializes in goods whose
demand is characterized by low income elasticities while North specializes in goods with high
income elasticities.
3.1 Trade reform and the provision of public goods
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by South
Consider rst the case in which South reduces uniformly its tari¤ rate on imports from
North, that is d < 0 while keeping   and income taxes unchanged. This policy change
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a¤ects the supply as well as the demand side. In terms of Figure 1, the A(z) schedule
shifts downwards and the TB schedule shifts to the right on impact. The impact e¤ect on
the supply side is that lower tari¤s imply that southern industries that compete closely with
northern industries cannot compete anymore with imports from the North. Consequently, ez
falls, unless w falls equiproportionally. The impact e¤ect on the demand side is that lower
tari¤s increase the value of southern imports. The lower price of northern goods in the
South increases real income in two ways. First, real income gains are realized from lower
price for all northern goods previously imported. Second, from importing previously not
traded goods. Southern households spend these real income gains on higher-ranked goods
produced by northern rms. To preserve trade balance the range of goods South produces
has to increase, which also requires w to fall. The responds in the range of imports as a
result of price changes is in stark contrast to the traditional literature where the revenue
impact of a tari¤ change is determined by the elasticity of both demand and supply (Blinder
1981).
The general equilibrium e¤ects of lower southern tari¤s are obtained by total di¤erenti-
ation of (2), (3), (15), and (17). This yields
bezb =  

(ez)N
w
R nez a(s)ds Na(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] ? 0 (24)bwb = (ez) Nw

(ez) R nez a(s)ds+ wa(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] > 0 (25)bezb =   Nw

(ez) R nez a(s)ds+ wa(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] < 0: (26)
We recall that (z)  [a^(z)=z^   ba(z)=z^] =  A^(z)=z^ denotes the elasticity of Souths relative
e¢ ciency with respect to z = ~z; ~z, which can take any positive value. A large (ez), for
example, implies that South has a strong comparative advantage in lower-indexed goods
which are exported, implying that changes in w hardly a¤ect the range of goods exported.
It also implies that comparative advantage is diminishing relatively quickly in z. In terms of
the upper panels of Figure 1: a lower (higher) value of (z) implies a atter (steeper) slope
of the A(z) and A(z)=  curves at z.12
A unilateral reduction of Souths tari¤ thus leads unambiguously to the deterioration of
Souths terms of trade and to an increase in the range of goods South exports. The e¤ect on ez
is not clear and crucially depends on the value of (ez). While lower southern tari¤s by itself
would imply a lower ~z, this e¤ect is countered by a fall in w, which is larger the larger (ez).
12Alternatively, the more equal unit labor requirements are and hence the more similar countries become
with respect to the technology they use, the atter the A(z) schedule.
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Moreover, the fall in Souths factor terms of trade enhances the competitiveness of Souths
export industries. Consequently, the change in ~z that is required to restore trade balance
equilibrium also depends on how the change in w enhances the competitiveness of Souths
exporting industries. The larger Souths comparative advantage in its export market, that is
the larger is (ez), the smaller the impact the lower w will have on Souths export range and
the larger the required change in ez: For su¢ ciently low (ez), therefore, the overall e¤ect of
lower southern tari¤s on ~z might result in a reduction in the range of goods South produces.
If the comparative advantage of Souths exporting industries is weak, a fall in w will imply
a large increase in Souths range of exports and a fall of ~z is consistent with restoring trade
balance equilibrium. In terms of Figure 1, the TB schedule shifts further to the right leading
northern rms to relocate to the South.
The tari¤ change and concomitant terms of trade e¤ect also a¤ect the range of goods
households are able to consume. While the overall impact on the range of goods consumed
is unambiguously positive (Na(n)nbn+Na(n)nbn > 0), these gains need not be evenly
distributed. Inserting (24)-(26), into (22) and (23) we obtain for North
a(n)n
bnb =   
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds
 bwb < 0;
and for South
a(n)nbn = Z nez a(s)ds

( bw   b)
=
Z n
ez a
(s)ds

(ez) Nw (ez) R nez a(s)ds Na(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] b 7 0:
For North, the terms of trade improvement leads northern consumers unambiguously to ex-
pand their range of goods adding higher-ranked goods of lower priority to their consumption
basket. By contrast, lower southern tari¤s a¤ect the range of goods southern households
are able to consume in two opposing ways. The reduction in  increases real income and
induces southern households to expand their consumption set towards higher-ranked goods
at impact. The subsequent deterioration of Souths terms of trade, however, mitigates the
benet of lower tari¤s. For su¢ ciently large (ez), the adverse terms of trade change is so
large that it more than o¤sets the primary e¤ect of the tari¤ reduction and southern house-
holds shift expenditure from higher-ranked goods toward lower-ranked goods (dn < 0), and
reducing its range of imports.
The impact of lower southern tari¤s on public good provision shifts the GG schedule to
the left and upwards in the lower panel of Figure 1a. Two e¤ects play a role. First, the direct
e¤ect of lower  reduces government revenue in the South as tari¤ revenues decline, holding
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constant the range of imports. This is the price e¤ect of lower tari¤s. Second, lower tari¤s
increase real income of southern households that is spend on goods produced by North, and
thus may increase Souths range of imports. This is the volume e¤ect of lower tari¤s in our
analysis. The change in the terms of trade has no direct bearing on public good provision,
as it reduces costs similarly, see (20). The e¤ects become clearer by total di¤erentiation of
(15), while making use of (24) and (25). This yields
bGb =  TRwagGN R nez a(s)ds
+
 TR
wagG
(   1)Na(ez)ez h(ez)N R ez
0
wa(s)ds Na(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] 7 0:
(27)
The rst term on the right-hand-side of (27) is the negative price e¤ect of lower tari¤s; the
second term indicates by how much tari¤ revenues change due to the change in the range of
goods imported. The second terms is positive (negative) if the range of imports decreases
(increases) and therefore either adds to (counters) the negative e¤ect of lower tari¤s on the
provision of public goods. Combining the results on dn and dez, the range of imports changes
according to
(dn  d~z)b ? 0 i¤ (ez) ? a(ez)ezR ez
0
a(s)ds
:
Consequently, for large enough (ez) a unilateral reduction of southern tari¤s lowers not only
the range of goods South imports and but leads also to cuts in the provision of its public
good G.
Similarly, the e¤ect on the publicly provided good in North can be gauged frombGb =  TR(    1)N

(ez) R nez a(s)ds+ wa(ez)ez
agG [(ez)Na(ez)~z + (ez)Na(ez)ez]

(ez)N Z ez
0
a(s)ds Na(ez)ez 7 0:
Of course, there is no direct e¤ect of lower southern tari¤s, holding constant the range of
imports. Consequently, the e¤ect on Norths public good provision solely depends on how
its tari¤ revenues change due to changes in its range of imported goods ez via the induced
change in w and the changes in import value via w. The former is represented by Na(ez)ez
in the bracketed term on the right-hand-side, while the latter is represented by N
R ez
0
a(s)ds.
As before, which terms dominates depends on the magnitude of (ez). In terms of Figure
1b, the GG-schedule shifts upwards as a result of the fall in w. This shift is larger the
larger is (ez):
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by North
Let us now consider the e¤ect of unilateral tari¤ reductions by the North, that is d  < 0;
ceteris paribus. This shifts the A(z)=  upwards with the vertical TB condition unperturbed
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at impact. Hence w increases while ez decreases.13 Total di¤erentiation of the equations
involved yields bezb  =   Na(ez)ez[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] < 0 (28)bwb  =   (z)Nwa(ez)ez[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] < 0 (29)bezb  = Nwa(ez)ez[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] > 0: (30)
A decline in   reduces the price of southern goods, holding constant imports, and unam-
biguously increases the range of products North imports (ez increases) as (some) northern
rms lose their competitive edge. To prevent this from happening, Norths factor terms of
trade have to fall (w increases) thereby reducing the range of goods South produces (ez falls).
This leads to further adjustments through the trade balance condition yielding the general
equilibrium e¤ects represented in (28)-(30).
Given these changes, the overall impact on the range of goods consumed is unambiguously
positive, with both countries benetting. For northern households, we obtain
a(n)nbn =    Z ez
0
wa(s)ds( bw + b )
=  
 (ez)Na(ez)ez hR ez
0
wa(s)ds
i
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]b  > 0;
indicating that the initial gain from lower tari¤s is powerful enough to dominate the sub-
sequent terms of trade deterioration. Likewise, the range of goods a southern household is
able to consume increases due to the improvement in Souths terms of trade:
a(n)nbn =   (z)Na(ez)ez R nez a(s)ds
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]b  > 0:
The impact of lower northern tari¤s on public good provision in North is given bybGb  =  TRagGN 
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds
   

TR
agG
(    1)Na(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]

Na(ez)ez + (ez)N Z ez
0
wa(s)ds

7 0:
The price e¤ect of lower   on government revenue in North is given by the rst term on the
right-hand-side. As before, lower tari¤s imply less public good provision on this account.
13This is most easily seen when the TB condition is expressed in terms of ez; instead of ez: In this case,
the intersection of the TB condition with the A(z)= curve determines ez and w, while ez can be read o¤
the A(z) curve.
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The second term is the volume e¤ect. It enters negatively, since Norths range of imports
increases unambiguously when it cuts tari¤s.
The e¤ect of lower northern tari¤s on public good provision in South is unambiguously
positive. Since the range of goods South imports expands  n goes up while ~z goes down
 tari¤ revenues increase. Formally,
bGb  =    TR(   1)Na(ez)ezNa(ez)ez[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] agG < 0:
When we compare the results of a unilateral tari¤ reduction by either of the two countries,
we see that there are some striking di¤erences. North gains from lower tari¤s on southern
imports in terms of an increase in the range of goods its households are able to purchase.
South, on the other hand, may lose from liberalizing trade unilaterally with North. This
is due to the asymmetric demand response. The income gains of lower southern tari¤s on
northern goods do not stimulate demand for southern goods because South specializes in
goods with low income elasticity in demand. Lower  leads to a loss of southern industries
which compete directly with northern rms, thereby reducing demand for its labor. In order
to preserve labor market equilibrium, South has to export a larger range of goods, requiring
it to move into industries in which it has weak comparative advantage. This may lead to
an adverse change in its terms of trade. The terms of trade deterioration could be so large
(large (ez)) that the direct income gains from lower tari¤s are more than compensated
and consequently, the range of goods southern households are able to purchase falls. The
concomitant fall in the range of goods Souths imports, reduces tari¤ revenues and thus the
provision of public goods.
North, the rich country, on the other hand, cannot lose from lower tari¤s on imports
from South, because it specializes in goods with high income elasticity in demand. Lower  
leads to a loss of northern industries directly competing with southern industries, reducing
the demand for northern labor, and thus requiring a deterioration in its terms of trade to
preserve labor market equilibrium. At the same time, the trade policy reduces the prices
of lower-ranked goods, bringing about real income gains for northern consumers which are
exclusively spent in North, increasing the demand for northern labor. As it turns out, the
gain from higher real income outweighs the adverse terms of trade e¤ect brought about
by the loss of industries so that northern household are able to purchase a larger range of
goods. Continuous trade liberalization leads to the emergence of new industries in the North
as dn > 0: The real income gains of northern households provide the economic climate for
new industries to be developed in North. While new industries appear in North, some older
northern industries relocate to the South.
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Multilateral Tari¤ Reductions
Let us consider the consequences of multilateral tari¤reductions, that is d= = d =  
dM=M < 0. This is an interesting exercise in light of the collapse of the latest multilateral
round of trade negotiations, the so-called Doha round. While the overall gains from reciprocal
trade liberalization are unambiguously positive, that is, Na(n)nbn+Na(n)nbn > 0; they
need not be evenly distributed. By adding the previous e¤ects of unilateral reductions for 
and  ; we obtain
bwbM =
h
(ez)(ez)N R ez
0
a(s)ds+ (ez)Na(ez)ez   (ez)Na(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]
bezbM =  
N
h
(ez) R ez
0
a(s)ds  2a(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]
bezbM =  
h
(ez)N R ez
0
a(s)ds+ 2Na(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] < 0
a(n)nbnbM =
(ez)N R nez a(s)ds h(ez) R ez0 a(s)ds  2a(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]
a(n)nbnbM =  
 (ez) h(ez)N R ez
0
wa(s)ds+ 2Nwa(ez)ezi hR ez
0
a(s)ds
i
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] < 0:
While multilateral tari¤ reductions unambiguously increase the range of goods South ex-
ports, dez > 0; and the range of goods northern households are able to consume, dn > 0;
they exert an ambiguous e¤ect on w, ez; and n. This is because our framework does not
impose any restriction on (ez) and (ez). Souths terms of trade deteriorate if (ez) >
Na(ez)ez=N R ez
0
a(s)ds: If (ez) >2Na(ez)ez=N R ez
0
a(s)ds; the deterioration of the
terms of trade is so large that southern households reduce the range of goods they are able
to consume, dn < 0; thereby increasing the range of goods South produces, dez > 0:14 As a
consequence, North would reap all benets of reciprocal trade liberalization.
The e¤ect on public good provision in both countries is given by
bGbM =  TR

N
R nez a(s)ds
wagG
+
 TR
wagG
(   1)NNwa(ez)ez
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] h(ez) R ez0 a(s)ds  2a(ez)ezi
14Using lHopital, it is straightforward to see that for (z) ! 1; Souths terms of trade unambiguously
deteriorate, while for (z) ! 1; the terms of trade deteriorate if (z) satieses the condition given in the
text.
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for South and
bGbM =  

tN
t
agG
+
 TR
agG
(    1)Nw
h
(ez) R ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ezi
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]


N(ez)
(ez)

(ez)Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez+Na(ez)ez
for North. As before, the total impact on public good provision consists of a price e¤ect
(the rst term in both expressions) and a volume e¤ect (the second term). The latter enters
ambiguously for both countries, as now both tari¤ rates are cut. For South, the volume
e¤ect contributes positively to public good provision provided its range of imported goods
increases. For North the volume e¤ect is clearly related to the terms of trade e¤ect. If
Norths terms of trade improve, the volume e¤ect contributes positively to its public good
provision.
In general, multilateral tari¤ reductions are considered to be benecial for all parties
involved as it enhances economic e¢ ciency. This perception is however not validated in
our model, in particular for poor countries. Reciprocal tari¤ reductions may diminish the
number of goods southern households are able to consume, while also the provision of public
goods may come down. Only if Souths comparative advantage in its export markets does not
diminishes too quickly (i.e. (~z) is low) will n increase, while the impact on G is then also
less detrimental. For households in the rich North, by contrast, multilateral tari¤ reductions
are benecial on account of the clear increase in n, while households may lose because of
less public good provision.
Our analysis also shows that reciprocal tari¤reductions are a better option for South than
to unilaterally liberalize trade. The condition that settles whether or not South gains in terms
of the highest good they are able to consume when cutting tari¤s is less restrictive under the
multilateral regime than under a regime where South cuts tari¤s unilaterally. Households
in North, by contrast, would rather have their government to cut tari¤s unilaterally. Even
though the e¤ect on the range of goods they can consume is qualitatively the same (n
goes up under both regimes), unilaterally cutting tari¤s is less detrimental to public good
provision in North. As such policy would also be highly welcomed by southern households,
the interesting conclusion is therefore that unilateral trade liberalization by rich countries is
to be preferred over any other trade liberalization scheme.
3.2 Budget neutral trade liberalization
In this section we are interested how trade liberalization a¤ects income taxes assuming that
the government wants to stabilize the provision of public goods. This is of interest because
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households are more often directly a¤ected by changes in income taxes in contrast to changes
in the provision of the public good. Formally, we x the level of public expenditure at level
G and G

and derive the required change in income taxes when countries liberalize trade.
Keeping the provision of public goods constant, we can interpret the induced changes in the
highest good a household consumes, n and n; as changes in utility in the presence of public
goods. This analysis is inspired by a recent IMF study of trade liberalization in countries
undergoing IMF-supported programs that nd a range of scal outcomes that let them to
conclude that some programs could have targeted more trade reform if greater attention had
been given to supporting scal policies and to revenue-neutral trade measures (see Ebrill et
al. 1999). Since this is particular acute for many developing countries, where taxes on trade
provide a substantial part of revenues, our analysis concentrates mainly on the South. (see
appendix A.2 for details).
[please insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic derivation of the equilibrium values of w, t, and t
by combining the reduced forms of the trade balance and government budget conditions.
The right hand panel of Figure 2 depicts the trade balance condition, TB; and the budget
constraint of South, SBC, while the left panel illustrates the budget constraint of North,
NBC. The intersection of the TB schedule with the SBC schedule, point A, determines
the equilibrium wage rate and the southern tax rate. Given the equilibrium wage rate, the
equilibrium northern tax rate can be read o¤ in the left panel, point A
0
.
The TB schedule is upward sloping since a higher income tax rate reduces income and
thus curbs imports. To preserve balanced trade w has to increase to compensate for the loss in
imports. The intuition for the slope of the SBC curve is more intricate. A higher income tax
rate t directly raises tax revenues by the amount of  twN:At the same time, it reduces income
and thus the range of imports and thereby lowering tari¤ revenues by (   1) TRwN= ,
rendering the total e¤ect on revenues ambiguous. For [ t   (   1) TR] > 0 a higher tax
rate raises revenue and w has to fall to retain the public good provision. This is the case
depicted in Figure 2. Given  ; this holds for  t =  TR but also for the policy relevant
situation where the southern government e¢ ciency of generating revenue from tari¤s is
mildly higher in comparison to tax revenue. By contrast, if the e¢ ciency of taxing income
falls seriously short of tari¤ collection, a higher income tax would reduce government revenue
and w has to go up to compensate by increasing imports and tari¤ revenues. In this case, the
SBC schedule is positively sloped. In our analysis we will rule out such perverse reactions
19
of lowering tari¤s on government revenues and assume that [ t   (   1) TR] > 0. 15
The slope of the NBC schedule is also ambiguous. A higher northern income tax rate (t)
increases directly government revenues. To retain a balanced budget, Norths terms of trade
have to improve (lower w). This shifts northern householdsexpenditure away from southern
goods towards northern goods, reducing tari¤ revenues on previously traded goods. At the
same time, lower w leads to the relocation of some northern rms to the South, increasing
the range of goods North imports and hence tari¤ revenues. For su¢ ciently large (ez); the
former e¤ect dominates and the NBC schedule slopes downward; otherwise NBC slopes
upward.
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by South
For given w, lower  creates a trade decit. In Figure 2, the TB schedule shifts to the
right. Holding imports constant, the immediate e¤ect of a reduction in the southern tari¤
rate is also to lower revenues. However, lower tari¤s lead to real income gains for southern
households which are spent on imports and increase tari¤ revenues. The larger is (ez) the
smaller these real income gains, yielding a government budget decit. For given w, the
income tax rate t has to increase. In terms of Figure 2, the SBC schedule shifts to the right,
to SBC
0
.
For the ultimate e¤ect on the factor terms of trade and tax rate, the extent of the
rightward shifts of both schedules is important. This depends not only on the degree of
comparative advantage southern rms have in their import market, i.e. on the value of (ez);
but also on the relative e¢ ciency of the southern government to raise revenue, i.e.  t and
 TR:
Suppose  t >  TR; only a small increase in the southern tax rate is necessary to com-
pensate for the loss in tari¤ revenues. Since a higher income tax rate also extend the trade
decit Souths terms of trade have to deteriorate to restore equilibrium. In terms of Figure
2, the shift in the TB schedule to the right is larger than that of the SBC schedule. The
new equilibrium is indicated by point B and concomitantly by B
0
(B
00
) for North. South
experience an adverse reaction in its terms of trade which is accompanied by a higher tax
rate. Formally, we derive
bwb = (ez)N

(ez) [ t    TR]  R nez a(s)ds+  twa(ez)ez	
wDB
(31)
15The is not a very restrictive assumption as the extent to which  t can fall short of  TR also depends
on the initial tari¤ rate. The lower the initial tari¤s, the less restrictive the condition will be, but even with
initially high tari¤s the condition will typically hold. For instance, if initial tari¤s are 100%,  t may still be
half the value of  TR for the condition to hold.
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btb =   TR
R nez a(s)ds [(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez]  (   1)a(ez)ezNa(ez)ez	
twDB
; (32)
with DB = f[ t   (   1) TR] (ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez) tNa(ez)ezg > 0:
By contrast, if  t <  TR; i.e., South is less e¢ cient in using tax revenue than tari¤
revenues, the degree of comparative advantage rms have in their export markets become
important. Assuming that the e¢ ciency gap is not too marked, that is, [ t   (   1) TR] >
0; Souths terms of trade might improve for su¢ ciently large (ez): In keeping the pre-
liberalization level of public good provision, the loss of tari¤ revenues has to be compensated
by a considerable increase in the tax rate, which turns the initial trade decit into a surplus.
Souths terms of trade have to improve to preserve balanced trade. In terms of Figure 2, the
shift in the SBC schedule is farther to the right than the one of the TB schedule. Provided
that (ez) is su¢ ciently large to make the NBC curve upward sloping, for North this implies
that it can lower income taxation for a given provision of public goods.
From (31) and (32), equation (22) becomes
a(n)n
bnb =
Z n
ez a
(s)ds(
bwb   1)  tw btb
=
( t    TR) (ez)N R nez a(s)ds
DB

(ez)Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez
+
 TRN
a(ez)ez
DB

(ez) Z ez
0
a(s)ds  (   1) a(ez)ez :
As is apparent from the above expression, the sign of dn=d does not only depend on the
relative strength of each countrys comparative advantage in its export market, (ez) and
(ez), but also on Souths e¢ ciency in collecting revenues.
For  t >  TR; t is raised and Souths terms of trade deteriorate. The magnitude of
the fall in w depends on Souths degree of comparative advantage in its export market.
For (ez) > a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds, southern rms have to move into industries in which they
have a weak comparative advantage, which leads to a deterioration in the factor terms of
trade. The range of goods South imports falls and the tax rate has to raise to replace the
shortfall in tari¤ revenues, thereby reducing the range of goods southern households are able
to consume, dn < 0. North, on the other hand, will reap all of the benets of liberalization.
Conversely, when  t <  TR; real income gains from liberalization are larger than the loss
caused by the adverse movement in the terms of trade, increasing the range of goods of
southern households. This is, however, countered by the increase in the tax rate, rendering
the total expression ambiguous.
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Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by North
Lower northern tari¤s generate a trade surplus for South and shifts the TB schedule to
the left. Given that the SBC curve is downward sloping, Souths terms of trade have to
improve to restore equilibrium and the southern income tax rate falls. The better terms of
trade for South reduce the range of domestic production, increases imports and the range of
goods South exports (higher ez), allowing the southern government to reduce the tax rate.
Formally
bwb  =  (ez) [ t   (   1) TR]Na(ez)ezDB < 0btb  =  TR(   1)a(ez)ezNa(ez)eztwDB > 0:
As a result, southern households welfare increases as they are able to purchase a larger range
of goods, dn > 0.
The northern government experiences a budget decit on impact, provided that (ez)
is su¢ ciently large: the loss in northern revenue dominates the increase in tari¤ revenues
caused by the migration of northern rms to the South and theNBC schedule shifts outward,
rendering the e¤ect on northern taxes and utility ambiguous. The e¤ect on the range of goods
northern households purchase and hence utility is ambiguous. On the one hand, they gain
from lower tari¤s but lose from a possible increase in income tax (higher t).16
Multilateral Tari¤ Reductions
Finally, when tari¤s are cut multilaterally, goods that were previously not traded in both
countries become tradeable. Additionally, and as before, imports of southern households
increase due to real income gains on previously traded goods. The e¤ect on Souths trade
balance is not clear and depends on the magnitude of (ez) and (ez): For (ez) > (ez)
su¢ ciently large, Souths trade balance slips into decit and both governments lose tari¤
revenues. In terms of Figure 2, the TB schedule and the SBC schedule shift to the right (with
the TB schedule proportionally more), while the NBC schedule shifts the left. If  t >  TR;
the income tax increases and Souths terms of trade deteriorate to restore equilibrium:
bwbM = ( t    TR)DB (ez)(ez)Nw 
Z n
ez a
(s)ds+
 t
DB
(ez)Na(ez)ez
 (ez)Na(ez)ez
DB
[ t    TR(   1)]
16The tax rate falls if (ez) is su¢ ciently small, making NBC 0 -curve the relevant curve in Figure 2. In
that case, the northern government experiences a surplus, shifting the NBC
0
-curve inward.
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btbM =    TRDBNt [(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez] Nw 
Z n
ez a
(s)ds
+
2(   1) TR
DBt
a(ez)ezNa(ez)ez:
As a consequence, southern households experience a welfare loss, dn < 0.
4 Trade liberalization and its scal implications: het-
erogeneous populations
We now extend our analysis to allow the income distributions F (h) and F (h) to be nonde-
generate. This is particularly interesting when the income of households with low skill levels
is so low in equilibrium that they are not able to purchase higher-indexed goods produced
in North. For the sake of concreteness, we therefore assume that there are two types of
households in both countries, those with low skill levels (hL; hL) and those with high skill
levels (hH ; hH) which are equal in number. Hence, in South there are N=2 households who
do not import, so that nL < ~z, while in North there are N=2 households who only import,
that is nL < ~z
. For simplication we keep the assumption that allows tax rates to di¤er
between regions but identical within a region.
Since the population in North consists of households which spend their marginal income
on southern goods, the trade balance condition will now depend on w. In terms of Figure
1, the A(ez) schedule intersects the TB curve at the upward sloping part. Appendix B.1
derives the analytical results for positive tari¤s.
4.1 Trade reform and the provision of public goods
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by South
Unilateral trade liberalization by South unambiguously causes Souths factor terms of
trade to deteriorate and its range of exports to increase, while having an ambiguous e¤ect
on the range of goods South produces. Qualitatively these e¤ects are the same as for the
homogeneous population case, while also the same condition applies to make Souths range
of production increase. Quantitatively there are some telling di¤erences though. Introducing
local income disparities, for instance, implies that a unilateral cut of southern tari¤s has a
much lower adverse e¤ect on its terms of trade. Since half of Souths population does not
import, they are insulated from the e¤ects of tari¤ changes, which mitigates the required
change of w to restore labor market equilibrium. Moreover, in contrast to the homogeneous
population case, the range of goods the poor southern population is able to purchase remains
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una¤ected (dnL = 0) while the range of goods the rich southern population is able to consume
is ambiguously and is given by
a(nH)nHbnH = Z nHez a(s)ds

(ez)N
DH

(ez)Z nHez a(s)ds  a(ez)ez
b < 0;
where DH = (ez)(ez)N R nL0 a(s)ds+(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez > 0. For (ez) >
a(ez)ez= R nHez a(s)ds; rich southern households are worse o¤: the terms of trade change is so
large that it more than o¤sets the primary e¤ect of the tari¤ reduction. Northern households
are better o¤ because improved terms of trade induces both types of household to shift
expenditure away from lower-ranked goods toward higher-ranked goods, that is dnL > 0 and
dnH > 0: New industries emerge in North.
The e¤ect on public good provision depends once more on a price e¤ect and a trade
volume e¤ect. While the former a¤ects G negatively, the latter e¤ect is ambiguous and
depends on the change of Souths import range. If (ez) < a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds) the import
range increases (both nH and ~z go up) and the volume e¤ect a¤ects public good provision
positively. Formally,
bGb =  TRN2wagG
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds
+
(   1) TRNa(ez)ez nh(~z)N R ez0 a(s)ds Na(ez)ezio
2DhagG
:
A unilateral tari¤ reduction in South also increases the range of goods North imports and
more public goods can be produced on account of an increase in import volume. As Norths
terms of trade improves, however, the price e¤ect on tari¤ revenues is negative, rendering
the overall e¤ect on G ambiguous. As with the homogeneous population case the overall
e¤ect is positive (negative) if (~z) < (>)a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds:
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by North
This unambiguously increases the range of products North imports (ez increases), and
some of the previously non-traded goods industries are taken over by South. Norths terms
of trade deteriorate
bwb  =   1(ez) bezb  =  (ez)NDH

(ez)Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ a(ez)ez < 0: (33)
In comparison to the homogeneous population case, (33) also includes a direct demand
side e¤ect of lower tari¤s. Since the poor faction of Norths population only import, lower
northern tari¤s directly increases demand for southern labor and Norths terms of trade
must deteriorate more to restore labor market equilibrium. In contrast to the homogeneous
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population case, the range of goods poor southern households consume is una¤ected, dnL =
0; while rich southern households are able to increase their consumption basket, dnH > 0:
Similarly, the range of goods both poor and rich northern households are able to consume
goes up, i.e. dnL > 0; dn

H > 0: Since the import range of North goes up, public good
provision in North increases on account of the volume e¤ect. The price e¤ect is of course
negative, leaving the total e¤ect on G unclear. As with the homogeneous population case
the e¤ect of lower northern tari¤s on Souths public good provision is unambiguously positive
as Souths import range goes up.
Multilateral Tari¤ Reductions
Reciprocal trade reductions increases Souths range of exports (higher ez) and renders
the e¤ect on w, ez; and nH ambiguous:bezbM =  NDH
h
(ez)R ez
0
a(s)ds  R nL
0
a(s)ds

  2a(ez)ezibwbM = 1DH
h
(ez)(ez)N R ez
0
a(s)ds+ (ez)Na(ez)ez   (ez)Na(ez)ezi
a(nH)nH
bnHbM = (ez)NDH R nez a(s)ds
h
(ez)R ez
0
a(s)ds  R nL
0
a(s)ds

  2a(ez)ezi ;
but leaves poor southern households una¤ected, dnL = 0: While the terms of trade ef-
fect is comparable to the homogeneous population case the e¤ect on ez and nH include
(ez) R nL
0
a(s)ds as an additional term. This reects the fact that Norths poor population
only purchase southern goods in equilibrium, implying that any e¤ect on their real income
has additional balance of payments consequences. The range of goods northern households
consume expands, i.e., dnL = dn

H > 0; and new industries emerge in North. The im-
pact on public good provision is ambiguous for both countries. Holding (ez) constant, both
South and North experiences a deterioration in the provision of their public goods if (ez)
is su¢ ciently large.
4.2 Budget neutral trade liberalization
Assuming that poor northern households spend their last unit of income on southern goods
implies that the trade balance depends additionally on the northern income tax rate t.
We use Figure 3a and 3b for a diagrammatic analysis of the comparative statics exercise
and delegate a formal treatment to appendix B.2. The gures are similar to Figure 2 but
di¤er by depicting the trade balances dependency on both tax rates explicitly, for example
TB(tA) in Figure 3b. As before, the slope of the SBC schedule is positive, provided that
C   t(hL + hH)   (   1) TRhH > 0 ruling out perverse reactions of tax increases on
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government revenue. To reduce clutter on notation, we further assume that  t =  

TR =  

so that C    (hL + hH)  (    1) hL > 0 regarding the NBC schedule.
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by South
As in the homogeneous case, the e¤ects on w and t are ambiguous. On impact, a drop
in  ; leads to twin decits provided that (ez) is su¢ ciently large.
[please insert Figure 3a about here]
In terms of Figure 3a, the TB(tA) schedule and the SBC schedule shift to the right on
impact, respectively to TB
0
(tA) and SBC
0
. To restore southern government budgets t has
to increase. As in the homogeneous case, if  t >  TR, only a small increase in the income
tax rate would be su¢ cient, which has to be accompanied by a fall in w to restore trade
balance:bwb =   CttN2NDBH8(    1)(   1)(~z) TR TR


[ t(hL + hH)   TRhH ] (~z)
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds+  t(hL + hH)wa(ez)ez ;
where DBH is a complex expression specied in appendix B.2 that is most likely negative.17
The deterioration in Souths factor terms of trade reduces tari¤ revenues for the northern
government on previously imported goods by the rich faction of the population. The tari¤
revenues paid by the poor northern households also fall but this is exactly compensated by
higher imports brought about by the improved terms of trade. But the fall in w also causes
some northern rms to migrate to the South, increasing imports and hence tari¤ revenues for
North. The extent of this relocation of rms depends on the value of (ez). For su¢ ciently
large (ez), the increase in trade is small so that northern tari¤ revenues fall the downward
sloping NBC schedule applies in Figure 3a and an increase in t is required to keep the
level of public expenditure unchanged:
btb =  C0

(~z)
Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez bwb ;
where C0 > 0 is a collection of parameters. In comparison to the homogeneous case, the
higher income tax reduces the spending power of the poor northern consumers who spent
their last unit of income on southern goods, who react by reducing imports. In terms of
Figure 3a, an increase in t from tA to t

B shifts the TB
0
(tA) schedule further downwards to
17A su¢ cient condition for DBH to be negative is that the gap in the northern skill levels is not too
marked.
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TB
0
(tB), accentuating the deterioration in Souths terms of trade (lower w) and the increase
in t. All southern households are worse o¤ (dnL < 0, dnH < 0). If southern rms com-
parative advantage in their export market is rather weak, i.e., (ez) < a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds,
the increase in trade is substantial so that northern tari¤ revenues raise and t falls. In this
case, the TB
0
(tA) schedule is shifting upwards, mitigating the fall in w and the increase in
t. Consequently, southern households lose less.
By contrast, if  t <  TR; the increase in the southern income tax is substantial and the
factor terms of trade might improve (higher w) for su¢ ciently large (ez). Poor southern
households are unambiguously worse o¤ due to the higher tax rate, dnL < 0. The welfare
change of rich southern households is ambiguous, though. The e¤ect on t depends on the
degree of comparative advantage southern rms have in their export markets, (ez):
Unilateral Tari¤ Reductions by North
With lower  , South experiences a trade surplus. Poor northern households expand
their consumption basket with southern goods, while rich northern households substitute
previously non-traded northern goods for southern imports. In terms of Figure 3b, the
TB schedule shifts to TB
0
(tA); ceteris paribus, improving Souths factor terms of trade and
raising the northern tax rate.
[please insert Figure 3b1 and 3b2 about here]
The impact on the northern government budget constraint is ambiguous though. The
tari¤ revenues from poor northern households fall while those from rich northern household
may either fall or increase, depending on the value of (ez). The smaller is (ez), the
smaller the di¤erence in the unit labor requirements in Souths export markets, the larger
the additional imports that come from the rich northern households. Provided that (ez)
is su¢ ciently small tari¤ revenues increase, generating a budget surplus on impact. The
NBC schedule is upward sloping and shifts to NCB
0
, as indicated Figure 3b1. By this
e¤ect, w would increase while the northern tax rate would fall. Taken together, this renders
the impact e¤ect on the northern tax rate ambiguous. However, for a su¢ ciently small
(ez), it turns out that the upward shift of the NBC schedule is larger than that of the
TB schedule so that the northern tax rate falls on impact. If, by contrast, (ez) is large,
lower northern tari¤s are bound to decrease government revenues. In this case, the NBC
schedule is negatively sloped as in Figure 3b2.18 The combined impact e¤ect results in a
higher relative wage rate while rendering the e¤ect on the northern income tax rate unclear.
18For (ez) > a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds, both the TB and the NBC schedule slope negatively, with NBC
schedule being steeper, see Appendix B.2.
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Both impact e¤ects point at an improved terms of trade for South, allowing the southern
government to reduce income taxes. However, the induced changes in t also entail con-
sequences for the position of the TB schedule. Since t falls to tB; the TB curve shifts
downwards. If (ez) is small, Souths factor terms of trade ultimately improve and its in-
come tax rate falls, point C in Figure 3b1. Southern households are better o¤. The ultimate
impact on northern taxes is then also positive. If (ez) is large, however, the e¤ects become
ambiguous.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we look at the e¤ects of trade liberalization and its scal implications in a
North-South setting when preferences are nonhomothetic. We use a two country Ricardian
trade model with a continuum of goods which we augment by introducing government sectors
that turn revenues from income taxation and import tari¤s into a public good. Additionally,
households consume a range of indivisible goods supplied by competitive markets. We order
these goods according to priority in consumption. We assume that the consumption of
each good is satised after one unit. The lowest-indexed goods have the highest priority in
consumption, whereas the highest-indexed goods have the lowest priority in consumption.
All households consume the lower-indexed goods, and when real income increases, they add
higher-indexed goods to their consumption baskets, instead of buying more of the goods they
already consume. The higher-indexed goods are therefore only a¤ordable by households with
su¢ ciently high income levels. South, the poorer country, has a comparative advantage in
the production of lower-ranked goods which all households consume, while North has a
comparative advantage in the production of low-priority goods, which household with higher
income consume. This implies that the poor (rich) country produces goods with low (high)
income elasticities in demand.
The assumption of nonhomotheticity in consumption implies that goods have non-unitary
income elasticities and that poor and rich households consume goods in di¤erent proportions.
In contrast to the standard trade model exposition, the e¤ects of policy changes are therefore
not invariant to the income level of the incipient country. Otherwise symmetrical policy
interventions may work out asymmetrically.
Take, for example, the case of a unilateral tari¤ reduction by either North or South.
While North gains from lowering its tari¤s on southern imports, a similar tari¤ reduction
by South may imply a loss for southern households. The reason is that the income gains
of lower southern tari¤s on northern goods do not stimulate demand for southern goods
because South specializes in goods with low income elasticities in demand.
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The dependence of e¤ects on the incipient countrys income level also apply to the impli-
cations of trade liberalization for the provision of public goods. The direct revenue e¤ect of
lowering import tari¤s in either country is the same - lower tari¤s imply lower tari¤ revenues
for either country - but the volume e¤ects are not. A tari¤ reduction by North unambigu-
ously increases Norths import range and thus raises revenues, while a similar tari¤ reduction
by South has an ambiguous e¤ect on Souths import range and concomitant tari¤ revenues.
Consequently, the implications for public good provision of similar tari¤ reductions are more
adverse for poorer countries. Regarding the scal implications of tari¤ reductions there are
less clear di¤erences between poor and rich countries. This becomes clear when consider-
ing the implications of government budget neutral tari¤ reductions, investigating required
changes in income taxation that secure public good provision at pre-liberalization levels. For
both countries, cutting import tari¤s typically implies that income taxes should go up. This
will be particularly the case when the strength of northern and southern rmscomparative
advantage in their respective import markets is strong. If it is weak, import ranges hardly
increase upon trade liberalization and income taxes must go up to balance the government
budget.
Allowing for nondegenerate income distributions in both countries leaves most of the
results qualitatively the same, but quantitatively there are some telling di¤erences. For
instance, a unilateral cut of southern tari¤s has a much lower adverse e¤ect on its terms of
trade. Since half of Souths population does not import, they are insulated from the e¤ects
of tari¤ changes, mitigating the required change of its factor terms of trade to restore labor
market equilibrium. As a consequence, the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the provision of
public goods is mitigated. For North, the e¤ects now also include a direct demand side e¤ect
since a faction of the population consumes only southern imports. Lower northern tari¤s
directly increase demand for southern labor and Norths terms of trade must deteriorate by
more to restore labor market equilibrium.
Nonhomotheticity in preferences also leads to asymmetric scal implications as a result
of multilateral tari¤ reductions. While multilateral tari¤ reductions are generally considered
to be benecial for all parties involved, this perception is not validated in our model, in
particular not for poor countries. Reciprocal tari¤ reductions may reduce both the number
of goods southern households are able to consume as well as the provision of its public good.
Only if Souths comparative advantage in its export markets is strong will the number of
goods consumed increase, making the negative impact on the provision of the public good
negligible. For households in the rich North, multilateral tari¤ reductions unambiguously
increase the consumption baskets, while losses incur because of lower public good provi-
sion. It also appears that reciprocal tari¤ reductions are a better option for South than
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to unilaterally liberalize trade, while households in North would favor their government to
cut tari¤s unilaterally. Since the latter option would also be favorable to South, unilateral
trade liberalization by rich countries is the more viable policy option than any other trade
liberalization scheme.
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A Derivations for Homogeneous Population
A.1 Unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization
Total di¤erentiation of (17), (20), and (21), and making use of (22), (23), (2), and (3), yields:
 N
a(ez)ez
(~z)
  Na(ez)ez
(~z)
 bw = Na(ez)ez
(~z)
b  +  Na(ez)ez
(~z)
  N
Z ez
0
a(s)ds
b
 Nwa(ez)ez
(~z)
bw + wagG
 TR(   1)
bG =  1
   1

N
Z n
ez a
(s)ds  Nwa(ez)ez
(~z)
b
N w
(~z)

(~z)
Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez bw  agG 
 TR(    1)
bG=
24 N wa(ez)ez(~z)
  
 1N
 
R ez
0
wa(s)ds
35b 
In matrix form: 264 w1 0 0w2 G2 0
w3 0 G

3
375
264 bwbGbG
375 =
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
where
w1 =  (ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez
(ez)(ez) w2 =  Nwa(ez)ez(ez)
w3 =
Nw
(ez)
h
(ez) R ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ezi G2 = 
   1
wagG
 TR
G3 =  
 
    1
agG

 TR
 1 =  

N
R ez
0
a(s)ds+
Na(ez)ez
(ez)

 2 = N


   1
R nez a(s)ds  wa(ez)ez(ez)

 1 =
Na(ez)ez
(ez)
 3 =
Nw
(ez)

a(ez)ez    
    1(ez) R ez0 a(s)ds

Taking the inverse yields264 bwbGbG
375 = 1
D1
264 G2G

3 0 0
 w2G3 w1G3 0
 w3G2 0 w1G2
375
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
;
with D1 = w1G2G3 > 0: Consequently,bwb =  1w1 bwb  = 

1
w1
bwbM =  1 + 

1
w1bGb = w1 2   w2 1w1G2 bGb  =   w2

1
w1G2
bGbM = w1 2   w2( 1 + 

1)
w1G2bGb =   w3 1w1G3 bG
b  = w1 3   w3 1w1G3 bG
bM = w1

3   w3( 1 +  1)
w1G3
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and the expressions as given in the main text readily follow, recognizing that in equilibrium
also bez =   [ bw   b ] =(~z) and bez =   [ bw + b ] =(~z).
A.2 Budget neutral trade liberalization
Requiring both South and North to keep a balanced government budget upon trade liberal-
ization, changes the matrix into:264 w1  t1 0w2  t2 0
w3 0  t3
375
264 bwbtbt
375 =
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
where all short-hand notations are as before and where:
t1 =  Nt; t2 = Ntw [ t   (   1) TR]
(   1) TR ; t

3 =  
  t
(    1)  TR
Nt:
Taking the inverse yields264 bwbb 
375 = 1
D2
264 t2t

3  t1t3 0
w2t

3  w1t3 0
t2w3  t1w3 w2t1   w1t2
375
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
;
with
D2 = [t2w1   w2t1] t3 = w NNtt t
 [ t   (   1) TR] (ez)Na(ez)ez +  t(ez)Na(ez)ez
(   1) (    1)  TR TR(ez)(ez)
positive since [ t   (   1) TR] > 0 by assumption. Dening DB  [ t   (   1) TR]
 (ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez) tNa(ez)ez, the expressions in the main text then readily follow.
Moreover, we get
bezb =  

(ez)(ez)N [ t    TR]  R nez a(s)ds  [ t   (   1) TR]w(ez)Na(ez)ez
(~z)wDBbezb =  N

(ez) [ t    TR]  R nez a(s)ds+  twa(ez)ez	
wDBbtb =   ( 1)N TRDB t t

[ t    TR] (ez) Z nez a(s)ds+  twa(ez)ez

(ez)Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez
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bzb  = = [ t   (   1) TR]Na(ez)ezDBbzb  =   tNa(ez)ezDBbtb  =    TRDB t t
(
[DB + (
   1) t(ez)Na(ez)ez] R ez0 wa(s)ds
 Na(ez)ez t (    1)wa(ez)ez
)
The e¤ects on n and n not given in the main text follow from a(n)nbn = R nez a(s)ds( bw b)
  tw

bt and a(n)bn =    R ez
0
wa(s)ds [ bw + b ]  tbt:
a(n)n
bnb =
"
N

(ez) [ t    TR]  R nez a(s)ds+  twa(ez)ez	
 tDB
#

(ez) [(    1)  TR     t ]Z ez
0
a(s)ds  (    1)  TRa(ez)ez
a(n)n
bnb  =  Na(ez)ezDB
(
[ t   (   1) TR] (ez) R nez a(s)ds
+(   1) TRa(ez)ez
)
a(n)n
bnb  =  tNwa(ez)ez tDB

( TR    t )  (ez)Z ez
0
a(s)ds   TR (    1) a(ez)ez
+
(ez) [ t   (   1) TR]Na(ez)ez TR
 tDB
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds
For multilateral tari¤ reductions we calculate:btbM =   ( 1)N TRDB t t

[ t    TR] (ez) Z nez a(s)ds+  twa(ez)ez

(ez)Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez
   TR
DB 

t t

(
[DB + (
   1) t(ez)Na(ez)ez] R ez0 wa(s)ds
 Na(ez)ez t (    1)wa(ez)ez
)
:
B Derivations for Heterogeneous Population
B.1 Unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization
In case of heterogeneous population, the budget constraints vary with the assumed skill level
of households. For southern households the budget constraints become:Z ez
0
wa(s)ds+ 
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds = (1  t)whH (high skilled households)Z nL
0
a(s)ds = (1  t)hL (low skilled households)
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while for northern households they are:
 
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds+
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds = (1  t)hH (high skilled households)
 
Z nL
0
wa(s)ds = (1  t)hL (low skilled households)
Consequently, Souths balanced trade condition becomes
N
Z nL
0
wa(s)ds+
1
 

(1  t)hH  
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds

= N
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds
as compared to (17) in the homogenous population setting. The governments budget con-
straint for South and North become, respectively
wagG =
N
2
 tt(hL + hH)w +
N
2
(   1) TR
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds
agG
 =
N
2
 t t
(hL + h

H) +
N
2
(    1) TR

(1  t)hL
 
+
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds

Total di¤erentiation of the equilibrium equations, making use of the household budget con-
straints for heterogeneous population and the conditions for e¢ cient production (2) and (3),
yields, in matrix notation:264 w1 0 0w2 G2 0
w3 0 G

3
375
264 bwbGbG
375 =
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
where:
w1 =  1
2
DH
(~z)(~z)
w2 =  N
2
wa(ez)ez
(~z)
w3 =
 w
(~z)
N
2
h
a(ez)ez   (~z) R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
G2 =
wagG
 TR(   1)
G3 =
agG
 
 TR(    1)
 1 =  N
2

1
w
R nHez a(s)ds+ 1 a(ez)ez(~z)

 2 =
N
2(~z)


   1(~z)
R nHez a(s)ds  wa(ez)ez  1 = N2
Z nL
0
a(s)ds+
a(ez)ez
(~z)

 3 =
N
2
 
    1
Z nL
0
wa(s)ds+  
Z ez
0
wa(s)ds  (
   1)wa(ez)ez
(~z)

and
DH  (~z)(~z)N
Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ (~z)Na(ez)ez + (~z)Na(ez)ez > 0:
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Taking the inverse yields264 bwbGbG
375 = 1
D3
264 G2G

3 0 0
 w2G3 w1G3 0
 w3G2 0 w1G2
375
264  1 

1
 2 0
0  3
375" bb 
#
;
with
D3 = w1G2G

3 =  
1
2
1
   1
 
    1
wagG
 TR
agG

 TR
DH
(~z)(~z)
< 0:
Consequently,bwb =  1w1 bwb  = 

1
w1
bwbM =  1 + 

1
w1bGb = w1 2   w2 1w1G2 bGb  =   w2

1
w1G2
bGbM = w1 2   w2( 1 + 

1)
w1G2bGb =   w3 1w1G3 bG
b  = w1 3   w3 1w1G3 bG
bM = w1

3   w3( 1 +  1)
w1G3
as in the homogeneous population case. The expressions for unilateral tari¤ changes as given
in the main text then readily follow. Furthermore, we derive:
bGb  =  
 TR(   1)Na(ez)ezN (~z)Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ a(ez)ez
2DHagG
< 0
bGb =   

TR(
   1)NN (~z) R nHez a(s)ds+ wa(ez)ez ha(ez)ez   (~z) R ez0 a(s)dsi
2DhagG
bGb  =
 TR
8<:
N
2
wDh
hR nL
0
a(s)ds
i
 Na(ez)ez [(    1)a(ez)ez]
+ [DH + (
   1)(~z)Na(ez)ez] R ez
0
a(s)ds
9=;
DHagG
Regarding multilateral tari¤ reductions, we calculate
bezbM =   1DH

(~z)N
Z ez
0
a(s)ds+
Z nL
0
a(s)ds

+ 2Na(ez)ez
bGbM =  TRwagGN2
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds
+
(   1) TRNa(ez)ezN
2DhagG
8><>:(~z)
0B@Z ez
0
a(s)ds 
nLZ
0
a(s)ds
1CA  2a(ez)ez
9>=>;
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bGbM = w 

TR
2DhagG
8>>>>><>>>>>:
DHN

R nL
0
a(s)ds+  
R ez
0
a(s)ds  (
   1)a(ez)ez
(~z)

 (    1)N
h
a(ez)ez   (~z) R ez
0
a(s)ds
i

N(~z)
R ez
0
a(s)ds N (~z)a(ez)ez
(~z)
+Na(ez)ez
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
B.2 Budget neutral trade liberalization
Requiring both South and North to keep balanced government budgets, changes the matrix
of total di¤erentiation into:264 w1  t

1  t1
w3  t3 0
w2 0  t2
375
264 bwbtbt
375 =
264  1 

1
0  3
 2 0
375" bb 
#
where all short-hand notations are as before and where additionally:
t1 =  N
2
thH

; t2 =
Nwt
2

 t
 TR   1(hL + hH)  hH

;
t1 =
N
2
thL
 w
; t3 =
Nt
2

 t 

 TR(    1)
(hL + h

H)  hL

:
Taking the inverse yields264 bwbtbt
375 = 1
DBH
264 t2t

3  t1t2  t1t3
w3t2 w2t1 w1t2  t1w3
w2t

3  t1w2 t1w3   w1t3
375
264  1 

1
0  3
 2 0
375" bb 
#
;
and the following derivatives follow:bwb = (t2 1   t1 2) t3DBH bwb  = t2 (t

3

1   t1 3)
DBHbtb = w2t3 1 + (t1w3   w1t3)  2DBH btb  = w2 (t

3

1   t1 3)
DBH
=
w2
t2
bwb btb = w3(t2 1   t1 2)DBH = w3t3 bwb bt
b  = w3t2 1 + (w2t1 w1t2) 3DBH :
Here we derive a su¢ cient condition so that the sign of the determinant DBH is negative.
DBH = [t2w1   w2t1] t3   t1t2w3
=   tt
NN
8(   1)(    1) TR TR
[ t(hL + hH)  (   1) TRhH ]

8>>>><>>>>:
 t(hL + hH)Nwa(ez)ez
(~z)
[  t (h

L + h

H)  (    1) TRhL]
[ t(hL + hH)  (   1) TRhH ]
+  t (h

L + h

H)

N
R nL
0
wa(s)ds+
Nwa(ez)ez
(~z)

 (    1) TRhLN
R nHez a(s)ds
9>>>>=>>>>; :
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Dene C   t(hL + hH)   (   1) TRhH ; let   =  TR =  t ; and use the trade balance
condition to replace N
R nHez a(s)ds; DBH reduces to:
DBH =   tt
NNw
8(   1)(    1) TR

8>>>>><>>>>>:
 t(hL + hH)Na(ez)ez
(~z)
[ (hL + h

H)  (    1)hL]
+ (hL + h

H)C
Na(ez)ez
(~z)
+ C hHN
 R nL
0
a(s)ds
CNhL
hR nL
0
a(s)ds  (    1) R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
:
All terms in the braced bracket are unambiguously positive except the squared bracketed
term since for hL 6 hH , ez > nL: As nL depends on hL, a su¢ cient condition for the
determinant to be negative is that the skill gap in North is not too large and northern tari¤s
are not too high, rendering the last expression in squared brackets small so that DBH < 0
follows.
Consequently, bwb =  NttNN8DBH [
 t (h

L + h

H)  (    1) TRhL]
(    1)(   1)(~z) TR TR

(
[ t(hL + hH)  hH TR] (~z)
R nHez a(s)ds
+ t(hL + hH)wa(ez)ez
)
btb = 1DBH NN
t
8(~z)(~z)
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
  hL
 1(~z
)N
R nHez a(s)ds (~z) w R nHez a(s)ds
  1
 1
1
 TR
(~z) [a(ez)ez] N R nHez a(s)ds
 TRh

L   
 
(    1) 

t (h

L + h

H)

+

 
(    1)
 t
 TR
(hL + h

H)

8><>:
h
(~z)N
R nL
0
a(s)ds+Na(ez)ezi

   1(~z)
R nHez a(s)ds  wa(ez)ez
9>=>;
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
btb = w3t3 bwb
=   
 TR(
   1)w
(~z)t [ t  (hL + h

H)   TR(    1)hL]

(~z)
Z ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ez w^
^
btb =  
h
(~z)
R ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ezi  NNNtw
8(~z)(~z) (   1)  TRDBH 
(~z)[ t(hL + hH)   TRhH ]
Z nH
ez a
(s)ds+  t(hL + hH)wa(ez)ez
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bwb  =  NNNttwC8(   1)(    1)(~z) TR TRDBH 8><>:  

t (h

L + h

H)

(~z)
Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ a(ez)ez
 hL TR(~z)
hR nL
0
a(s)ds+
R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
9>=>;
Let   =  TR =  

t we obtainbwb  =  NNNttwC8(   1)(    1)(~z) TR TRDBH 
(ez) hH Z nL
0
a(s)ds  hL
Z ez
0
a(s)ds

+ (hL + h

H)a(ez)ez
btb  =   NNNtw a(ez)ez8Dbnh TR(    1)(~z)(~z) 8><>:  

t (h

L + h

H)

(~z)
Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ a(ez)ez
 hL TR(~z)
hR nL
0
a(s)ds+
R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
9>=>;
btb  = twwNN 8Dbnh(~z)(~z) TR(   1)(    1) 8>>>><>>>>:
N(~z) [ t(hL + hH)  (   1) TRhH ]
(~z)
Z nL
0
a(s)ds+ a(ez)ez hR nL
0
a(s)ds+
R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
+ t(hL + hH)Na(ez)ez h(~z) R nL0 a(s)ds+ (~z)  R ez0 a(s)ds  (    1)a(ez)ezi
9>>>>=>>>>;
Here we derive the slopes of the curves in Figure 3 and show that the NBC curve is the
steeper of the two negative curves in Figure 3b2.
Slope of TB-curve:  bwbt (t)

TB
=
(~z)(~z)NthH
DH
> 0 bwbt (t)

TB
=  (~z
)(~z)NthL
 wDh
< 0
Slope of SBC-curve: bwbt

SBC
=  (~z
)(~z)Nwt
(   1) TRDH [ t(hL + hH)  (   1) TRhH ]
Slope of NBC-curve: bwbt

NBC
=
(~z)t [ t 
(hL + h

H)   TR(    1)hL]
 (    1) TR
h
wa(ez)ez   (~z) R ez
0
wa(s)ds
i
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For (~z) > a(ez)ez= R ez
0
a(s)ds; both the NBC-curve and the TB-curve are negatively
sloped with the NBC-curve the steeper of the two. This implies the following inequality
  [
 t (h

L + h

H)   TR(    1)hL]
 TRN(    1)
h
(ez) R ez
0
a(s)ds  a(ez)ezi
<   (ez)hL
[(ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)Na(ez)ez + (ez)(ez)N R nL
0
a(s)ds]
;
where the left hand of the inequality is the slope of the NBC-curve, while the right hand
side reects the slope of the TB-curve. After some manipulation we obtain
[hH
 + hL] (ez)Na(ez)ez +  (hL + hH)(ez)Na(ez)ez
+ [hH
 + hL] (ez)(ez)N Z nL
0
a(s)ds  (ez)(ez)hLN(    1)Z ez
0
a(s)ds
> 0;
provided that the skill gap in North is not too marked.
The relative shift of both curves, holding t constant, is determined by:
 1w3    3w1
w1w3
=
 
8<:
h
(~z)(~z)N
R nL
0
a(s)ds+ (~z)Na(ez)ezi h(~z) R ez
0
a(s)ds+ (~z)
R nL
0
a(s)ds
i
+
h
 (~z)
R ez
0
a(s)ds+ (~z)
R nL
0
a(s)ds  (    1) a(ez)ezi [(~z)Na(ez)ez]
9=;
(    1)DH
h
a(ez)ez   (~z) R ez
0
a(s)ds
i
which is positive (negative) if (~z) is su¢ ciently large (small).
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Figure 1a: Trade policy equilibrium and public good provision in South – homogeneous 
populations
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Figure 1b: Trade policy equilibrium and public good provision in North – homogeneous 
populations
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Figure 2. Budget-neutral liberalization and unilateral reduction in southern tariff, dτ<0.
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Figure 2. Budget-neutral liberalization, unilateral reduction in southern tariff, dτ<0.
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Figure 2. Budget-neutral liberalization and multilateral reduction in tariffs, dτM<0.
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Figure 3a. Heterogeneous population: budget-neutral liberalization and unilateral reduction in southern tariff, dτ<0
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Figure 3b1. Heterogeneous population: budget-neutral liberalization and unilateral reduction in northern tariff, dτ*<0
for ζ(z*) sufficiently small 
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Figure 3b2. Heterogeneous population: budget-neutral liberalization and unilateral reduction in northern tariff, dτ*<0
for ζ(z*) sufficiently large
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